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Security practices such as Audits that often focus on penetration testing are 
performed to find flaws in some types of vulnerability & use tools, which have 
been tailored to resolve certain risks based on code errors, code conceptual 
assumptions bugs, etc. Most existing security practices in e-Commerce are dealt 
with as an auditing activity. They may have policies of security, which are 
enforced by auditors who enable a particular set of items to be reviewed, but 
also fail to find vulnerabilities, which have been established in compliance with 
application logic. In this paper, we will investigate the problem of business logic 
vulnerability in the component-based rapid development of e-commerce ap-
plications while reusing design specification of component. We propose secure 
application functional processing Logic Security technique for component-based 
e-commerce application, based on security requirement of e-business process 
and security assurance logical component behaviour specification approach to 
formulize and design a solution for business logic vulnerability phenomena. 
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Application Business Logic: The business logic describes the particular “ser-
vice” (such as Account Service by Account Component’s business logic) offered 
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by business domain’s business component, (this logical component can be part of 
sub-component or sub-system or system, both of which represent components 
in their own right) the steps required to complete or perform a particular action 
as defined by the business component-based application to automate business 
process; it uses logical component-ware and each component business logic makes 
a set of functionality by integrating these components business processing logic 
to make logical component-ware, which then makes overall application’s busi-
ness logic in the e-commerce system at middle tier [1]. 
Business logic layer within the application is developed with two kinds of 
components, Business Processing components and Business Entity Components. 
The “Business Process Components” handle the services or transactions that are 
requested by users through the user interface. They determine the operations of 
the business entity components that must be invoked and the order in which 
they must be executed. The “Business Entity Components” are persistent. They 
represent the business entity types of the application domain whose state must 
be stored by the application [2]. 
The middle tier contains wide range of components from different layers such 
as web components managed by web servers and business object components 
managed by application servers. The web component dynamically process user 
requests and constructs response to client application. The business object com-
ponents implement business logic of a business domain. Both components are 
managed by an infrastructure environment such as J2EE or CORBA platform 
servers that provides important system infrastructure services for these compo-
nents such as runtime environment for component compatibility, container 
management, security. Client components focus only on presentation logic, and 
business components provide business logic within a business domain as shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Middle tier of e-commerce servers that implements the business application 
logic [1] [3]. 
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The middle tier of e-commerce servers implements the business application 
logic. The business application logic represents the functions or services that a 
particular e-commerce site provides. As a result, a given site may often employ 
custom-developed logic. As the demand for e-commerce services grows, the so-
phistication of the business application logic grows accordingly [1] [3]. Tradi-
tionally, e-commerce sites implement the middle tier of software on web servers 
using the common gateway interface (CGI). CGI scripts are programs that run 
on the web server machine as separate processes from the web server software. 
The web server invokes these general-purpose programs in response to user re-
quests. The CGI scripts’ main function is to process user input and performs 
some services (such as retrieving data from a database, or dynamically creating a 
web page) for the user because CGI scripts process untrusted user input, the se-
curity risks associated with the CGI (and other forms of middle tier software) are 
extremely high. Many attacks against web-based systems exploit CGI scripts [1] 
[4]. A very simple example of business application logic would be a customer 
adding an item to an online shopping basket & then being required to provide a 
name, address & payment details before being able to complete the purchase. 
application logic (also called business logic because it perform action as per de-
fined business process which integrated through CBS application by developer, 
so it’s called business logic, it’s also noted that it does not refer to the general 
functionality of a web server, but to the specific operations of the application’s 
function, such as product discounts, postage pricing rules, etc. Cyber-attacks are 
the core of any security assessment of Web based e-Commerce systems [1]. One 
of the more promising research fields in this context is related to the representa-
tion of the Vulnerabilities, Attack patterns Classification. Several models are 
proposed to represent these; these models usually provide a generic representa-
tion of attacks. According to the Purdue University Researchers, Conversely, the 
experience shows that attack profiles are strongly dependent upon several boun-
dary conditions these conditions could be based on three well defined Areas: 1) 
Environmental (faults discovered by I. Krsul, 1998); 2) Coding (fault); 3) Confi-
guration errors [5] [6]). Whereas in 2004 University of Luton researcher Faisal 
Nabi first time identified that design flaw could also be a cause of attack profile 
boundary condition of design specification in e-commerce systems (Faisal Nabi, 
2004). In this paper, we will investigate design flaw attack profile boundary con-
dition (that caused business logic attack) interms of reuse design specification in 
the CBS e-commerce systems. 
2. Web Software Application Complexity &  
Component-Based-Development Risks 
Modern web applications run large-scale software applications for e-commerce, 
Information distribution, entertainment, collaborative research work, surveys, & 
numerous other activities. They run distributed hardware platforms & hetero-
geneous Computer systems. The software that powers web applications is distri-
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buted, is implemented in multiple languages & styles, incorporates much reuses 
& third-party components, is built with cutting edge technologies as stated (sec-
tion above component based software) & must interface with users, other web 
sites & databases. Although. The word “heterogeneous” is often used for web 
software, it applies in so many ways that the synonymous term “diverse” is more 
general & familiar, & probably more appropriate [7]. The software components 
are often distributed geographically both during the development & deployment 
(diverse distribution), & communicates in numerous distinct & sometimes novel 
ways (diverse communication) [8]. Web-based software systems are created by 
combining a variety of components from various sources, such as custom-built 
special-purpose applications, customised commercial-off-the-shelf software com-
ponents, and third-party software [7]. Much of the new complexity found with 
web-based applications also results from how the different Software components 
are integrated. Not only is the source unavailable might be hosted on computers 
at remote, even competing organization. To ensure high quality for the web sys-
tems composed of very loosely coupled components, which seriously required 
evaluate these Components connections [9]. 
Web software components are coupling more loosely than any previous soft-
ware application [7]. AS it is stated above that e-commerce sites offer more than 
front-end servers, they usually run complex Middleware programmes such as CGI 
scripts, Java servlets, application servers & component-based-software such as 
EJB Java beans, Java 2 Enterprise Edition (J2EE), CORBA, COM & DCOM com-
ponents-based solution. One reason for the emergence of this component-based 
software on e-commerce sites is the complexity of the software necessary to im-
plement business application logic. This Complexity, in turn, introduces the 
more Software Flaws that can be exploited for malicious, gain [3]. 
The web’s function & structure have changed drastically, particularly in the past 
couple of years, yet most software engineering researchers, educators, & practi-
tioners have not yet grasped how fully this changes affects engineering principles 
& process [7], example of a changes in last couple of years idea use of web 2.0 
feature Ajax (The Ajax engine is the client-side code that handles calls between 
the client & server. Typically this would be a library of JavaScript function in-
cluded on the page [10], more prone it is to have flaws in that any attacker with 
basic skills can use proxy software(or call script functions directly)to bypass the 
intended logic/business logic due to complexities involved & since more applica-
tion logic is being delegated to web browsers, this idea of Ajax is leading to open 
flaw which allows intruders to easily read the source code & look for weakness 
area in the system middle tier application logic. Sharing business logic client-side 
reveals source information of the complete system, which is too dangerous com-
bining representation logic, rendering logic & business logic & resides business 
logic client & Application sever-side. For example, Ajax-enable application with 
multiple levels of user account it was found that the site employed one JavaScript 
include file for the entire client-side logic. 
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This meant that an anonymous user with trail account could see the logic be-
hind the administrator-level service call. The locations of all administrator ser-
vice script were disclosed, providing invitation a definitive map of application to 
a potential attacker to attack business logic in the middle tier. Therefore, in this 
scenario EASI framework also get failed to protect the system integrity & securi-
ty. Another example, developing a simple script that allows one to use thousands 
of e-coupons or using a similar script to open thousands of brokerage accounts 
that can each receive small deposits from a bank—usually around five cents—to 
verify transactions. In the end, one could end up making tens of thousands as 
shown in Figure 2. 
Web sites are now fully functional software systems that provide business- 
to-customer e-commerce, business-to-business ecommerce & many services to 
many users. The growing use of third-party software components & middleware 
represents one of the biggest changes in the e-commerce web software-Application 
systems so as security; integrity has threaten because of the flaws in the design, 
up to 50% of software defects leading to security problems are software archi-
tecture & design flaws [11]. In other words during the high-level-design stage of 
software architecture design & technology architecture design decisions corres-
pondence of web software structure that how various components will be inte-
grated & interact, and which technologies will requirement define software func-
tion interpreted, failure in this cause 50% of software defects which then leading 
to security problem & threaten the internal software application integrity itself 
compromise because of software architecture & design flaws at the high-level- 
design. 
In commerce systems, especially e-commerce applications, relatively little se-
curity analysis are done at the business logic level. Most analysis at this level is 
focused on detecting what we would call mistakes in the implementation of a set  
 
 
Figure 2. Application logic flaw resides both end client & server side. 
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of business rules, rather than detecting mistakes in their design. Examples of im-
plementation error are the improper configuration of a CGI server, or the choice 
of CGI as an implementation language in the first place [1]. Examples of the busi-
ness logic error are frauds in the business process, such as unsuitable transac-
tions and abuse for personal enrichment through deliberate misuse or misappli-
cation. 
3. Research Design Strategy 
Since our main scope of this research study is to focus on business compo-
nent-based application logic problems and identify vulnerability that is because 
of mismatch between business process specification and logical component-ware 
specification at design level while using rapid development business compo-
nent-based-software approach for business application logic in e-commerce sys-
tem. 
In the light of business logic vulnerability definition [12] [13], we have taken a 
case study from the industrial sector (Bank Case Study of business application 
logic), research process would go through stages as explained in the paper, these 
are based on vulnerability risk analysis in terms of security perspective, for that, 
it is very important to integrate the knowledge contained in the attack method 
with boundary knowledge related to vulnerability of the target Component-based- 
Software application e-commerce system. Our focus is to consider multi-layer speci-
fication based on components business event scenario using Bank Case Study. In 
this technique, process is divided into two phases: 1) High level view of system 
tier 2) Component layers. The High level view of system tier focus on the high 
level view of the design product, and component level layers will consider the 
design, test, and diagnostics specification for a separate entity component that 
take part in the system building. 
4. Security Properties Violations [Problem Area] in Business  
Tier 
The violation of Integrity & security within the web software application & com-
ponents based software that develop rapid business application logic that can be 
custom-developed/COTS, because of flaws at design level in web software appli-
cation, the use of components based software risks the cause of these logical 
vulnerabilities can subvert, misuse & circumvent the steps defined by function of 
the application that is not intended to do described by the function & business 
process specification [12]. 
Unfortunately, even simple flaws in the complex middleware layer can pro-
vide the leverage necessary to bypass even strong authentication schemes. Whe-
reas most front-end & back-end systems are commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) 
software packages, a good portion of the middleware software is necessarily cus-
tom-development in order to implement every business’s particular application 
logic. The most significant weak link in server-side systems is the middleware 
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layer. Therefore, a strong risk management plan will focus on providing rigorous 
software assurance for the middleware software [3]. 
Web Software Application Vulnerability 
We define web software application vulnerability definition as web software ap-
plication vulnerability includes mismatches between application software archi-
tectural/design logic & the assumptions about the environment made during the 
development/Implementation (code writing), operation of the programme and the 
environment in which the programme executes [13].  
5. Logical Vulnerabilities in Application Layer 
Since our main scope of this research study is to focus on investigation web soft-
ware application logic problems & identify vulnerability that is because of mis-
match between business process specification and component ware specification 
at design/Architecture level while using rapid development business compo-
nent-based-software approach for business application logic in e-commerce sys-
tems. Our attack patterns are more specific to what components can pinpoint 
vulnerability in a system design. We will only target business application Logic 
vulnerabilities. 
Problem Cause Definition & Explanation 
Application Logic Attacks Operation: 
Unlike, common application technical attacks, such as SQL injection or Buffer 
overflow, each application logic attack is usually unique, since it’s not been men-
tioned or part of any taxonomy of web application attacks, and since it has to 
exploit a function or feature that is specific to the application. Since, application 
logic attacks are not based on characteristics like buffer overflow which can be 
characterize them as other technical vulnerabilities in the web application (SQL, 
SSI or buffer overflow).This makes it more difficult for automated vulnerabilities 
testing Tools to identify or detect such vulnerability class of attacks because they 
are caused by the flaws in application Logic & not necessarily faults/bugs in the 
actual code. 
6. Bank Case Study Component-Based-Rapid Development 
Brief Summary of the (Design Flaw of CBS Reuse): 
This real time case defines a classical incident & serious mistake, which caused 
design flaw in application logic, while reusing the component and misconfigura-
tion of the server—side component, cause security flaw in the business logic. 
The same component that was incorporated into the registration functionality 
also was used elsewhere within the application, including within the core func-
tionality. The reason of this problem is gap between purpose of business process 
integration, and purpose of specification that seriously violated business logic 
design specification and their boundary conditions with respect to component- 
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based-software developed (CBSD), where CBSD application developer used rapid 
development approach in order to reuse the component but developer totally 
ignored the current application logic based on existing components logic, and 
their processing business logic. It shows that the assumption of the developer 
that just kept in view realization contract of component specification, which was 
depending on the component model specification that only provides support for 
deployment infrastructure. This refers to specifying the realization contracts in 
terms of component-based software model specification, but not usage contract 
specification. The usage contract translates service offered by a component in-
terface specification. An interface–focused-design (completely focus on interface 
as the main design abstraction that encourages designers to take into account 
system behaviour more abstractly) component-based development approach de-
fines encapsulated behaviour accessible through well-defined Interfaces. An in-
terface is basically a description of combination a set of operations, and every 
operation represents service that acts based on component instances upon the 
client’s invocation *request* for a particular service which is established through 
contracts (it can be a logical component or a building block that is used as a bind-
ing package of functionality to build logical component, either case is possible). 
Therefore, this above explained case disclose clear violation, separation of busi-
ness logic from implementation logic, case falls into purpose of specification 
re-using against its boundary conditions with respect to current component- 
based-software developed (CBSD) designed business logic. This converted the 
problem into logical vulnerability in the application layer. These are business 
component-based-rapidly developed (RDA) web software architecture and de-
sign flaws, which fall into the business component-based-software (BCBS) busi-
ness process specification that refers to business process integration, which can-
not be detected, by any code scanning tools for web application or any statically 
or dynamically analysis approach such as traditional Black Box Analysis tools for 
web application. 
Detailed Description of the Case Study: 
The Application Functionality & Business Process: 
The application enabled existing customers who did not already use the online 
application to register to do so. New users were required to supply some basic 
personal information, to provide a degree of assurance of their identity. This in-
formation included name, address, and date of birth, but did not include any-
thing secret such as an existing password or PIN number. When this informa-
tion had been correctly entered, the application forwarded the registration re-
quest to back-end systems for processing. An information pack was mailed to 
the user’s registered home address. This pack included instructions for activating 
their online access via a telephone call to the company’s call center and a one-time 
password to use when first logging in to the application. 
The Design Logic of Application: 
The application’s designers believed that this mechanism provided a very ro-
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bust defence against unauthorized access to the application. The mechanism im-
plemented three layers of protection: 
1) A modest amount of personal data was required up front, to deter a mali-
cious attacker or mischievous user from attempting to initiate the registration 
process on other users’ behalf. 
2) The process involved transmitting a key secret out-of-band to the custom-
er’s registered home address. Any attacker would need to have access to the vic-
tim’s personal mail. 
3) The customer was required to telephone the call center and authenticate 
himself there in the usual way, based on personal information and selected digits 
from a PIN number. 
This design was indeed robust. The logic flaw lay in the actual implementation 
design of the mechanism. The developer was implementing the registration me-
chanism needed a way to store the personal data submitted by the user and cor-
relate this with a unique customer identity within the company’s database. Keen 
to reuse existing Component code, they came across the following class, which 
appeared to serve their purposes: 
Event Trigger Component Cause of Business Logic Flaw; 
class CCustomer 
{ 
String firstName;  
String lastName;  
CDoB dob; 
CAddress homeAddress;  
long custNumber; 
After the user’s information was captured, this object was instantiated, popu-
lated with the supplied information, and stored in the user’s session. The appli-
cation then verified the user’s details, and if they were valid, retrieved that user’s 
unique customer number, which was used in all of the company’s systems. This 
number was added to the object, together with some other useful information 
about the user. The object was then transmitted to the relevant back-end system 
for the registration request to be processed. The developers assumed that making 
use of this code component was harmless and would not lead to any security 
problem. However, the assumption was flawed, with serious consequences. 
Attack Pattern Birth: 
The same *component (code)* that was incorporated into the registration 
functionality was also used “use case logic (+Process and Entity Type Logic)” 
within the application, including within the core functionality, which gave au-
thenticated users access to “Account details component”, “Statement’s compo-
nent”, “Funds transfers component”, and “Debit compoenet, Credit component 
and other information component”. When a registered user successfully authen-
ticated itself to the application, this same object was instantiated and saved in 
her session to store key information about her identity. 
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The majority of the functionality within the application referenced the infor-
mation within this *CCustomer (Component)* object in order to carry out its 
actions because *CCustomer (Component)* object is candidate component 
(Process and Entity Type logic) within the majority of application functionality 
referenced the information within this component to carry out action—for ex-
ample, the account details presented to the user on his/her main page were gen-
erated on the basis of the unique customer number contained within this com-
ponent object. The way in the component code was already being employed with-
in the application meant that the developers’ assumption was flawed, and the 
manner in which they reused it did indeed open up a significant vulnerability. 
Although the vulnerability was serious, it was in fact relatively subtle to detect 
and exploit. Access to the main application functionality was protected by access 
controls at several layers, and a user needed to have a fully authenticated session 
to pass these controls as defined in Figure 3. 
Bank Security Defence: 
Figure 4 defined the application protected by access controls .Although the 
vulnerability stated above was serious; it was in fact relatively subtle for intruders 
to detect and exploit. Access to the main application functionality was protected 
by access controls at several layers,(channel level security) and a user needed to 
have a fully authenticated session to pass these controls and second security de-
fence line was (security level 2: fraud management) as projected in the figure 
below. 
Exploiting the Logic Flaw Scenario: 
To exploit the logic flaw, therefore, an attacker needed to perform the follow-
ing steps: 
■ Log in to the application using his own valid account credentials. 
 
 
Figure 3. Attack birth its life cycle in barclay bank service flow. 
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Figure 4. Bank application functionality protected by access controls & (COTS) security 
products.  
 
■ Using the resulting authenticated session, access the registration functionality 
and submit a different customer’s personal information. This causes the ap-
plication to overwrite the original “CCustomer” (Component) object in the 
attacker’s session with a new object relating to the targeted customer. 
■ Return to the main application functionality and access the other customer’s 
Account. A vulnerability of this kind is not straightforward to detect when 
probing the application from a Black-box perspective. However, it is also 
hard to identify when reviewing or writing the actual source code. Without a 
clear understanding of the application as a whole and the use made of differ-
ent components in different areas, the flawed assumption made by develop-
ers may not be evident. Of course, clearly commented source code and design 
documentation would reduce the likelihood of such a defect being intro-
duced or remaining undetected. 
Attacking Method in This Scenario: 
■ In a complex application involving either horizontal or vertical privilege se-
gregation, try to locate any instances where an individual user can accumu-
late an amount of state within their session which relates in some way to their 
identity. 
■ Try to step through one area of functionality, and then switch altogether to 
an unrelated area, to determine whether any accumulated state information 
has an effect on the application’s behaviour. 
6.1. Investigated Reason of Vulnerability in the Light “State of Art  
CBSD” in Business Logic 
Component-based-rapid development approach is a method to make business 
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logic in the application layer of e-commerce system. Each component has busi-
ness rules, which develop business logic in the component. Since business appli-
cation logic is developed with business components, it develops logical compo-
nentware. Each component business logic makes a set by integrating these com-
ponents to develop “logical component ware”, and then business application 
logic is rapidly developed. Reuse of component in the e-commerce applications, 
means business component (that has a complete function, business logic based 
on business rules) designer starts design that which business component can be 
reused but it is also very important that designer must have complete knowledge 
about previous designed business logic in the system, so that no logical vulnera-
bility could provide opportunity to intruder to violate the business application 
Logic in e-commerce system. 
This case study describes, complete design based on component-oriented in-
tegration process and how developer made mistake during the integration, while 
ignoring business logic of the application’s current functionality. This problem 
caused wrong analysis of existing component-based business application logic. 
Business process integration, which depends on logical component’s interface 
specification in business component, it refers to business function/processing 
logic specification. (Components are reusable units for composition. This state-
ment captures the very fundamental concept of component-based development, 
that an application is made up and composed of a number of individual parts, 
and that these parts are specifically designed for integration in a number of dif-
ferent applications. It also captures the “idea that one component may be part of 
another component” [14], or part of a sub-system or system, both of which 
represent components in their own right). Integration of all this process, then 
develop overall business processing logic for a business component-based soft-
ware to develop an application in the middle tier, which is connected with in-
formation system in the back-end systems of organization. 
Since business process integration is made on the base of business functional 
concern; it cannot be dealt with technological point of view, because problem is 
not based on technical or technological specific principle of Integration, which is 
based on related to some particular physical component model such as (J2EE, 
CORBA, COM), but as it is stated, issue identifies that business processing de-
signed solution based on business components and their business processing in-
tegration. This is the point, where the focus is set to the logical structure of the 
“business solution”, this is the stage where logical problems occurs due to lack of 
paying attention to the design-based business component interfaces used and 
offered testing environment within the logical structure of the business solution, 
are known as Business Logic Vulnerabilities [12] [13] [15]. 
Moreover, during the investigation we also discovered that Bank developer 
was keen to reuse component totally ignored component specification, different 
components in multi-layers, their existing offered & used interfaces contract 
constrains, that assure the level of assurance while using component logic within 
the e-commerce system. Developer used the just physical component model spe-
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cification, which is very serious violation of the principles that use case logic, 
processing logic of entity type logic of business component is not reused within 
the same application. As we demonstrated to justify this explanation by using 
one of the current, physical component-model specification technology J2EE 
and its reference architecture as defined in Figure 5(a). 
Diagnostics specification for a separate entity component that takes part in the 
system building, Process of this course of exercise as stated above in the Section 
3. This exercise confirms high level design view of e-business process to diagnos-
tics specification of each layer and its participant components role, and their of-
fered and usage Contracts for detailed Design for Test (DFT) process of verifica-
tion and validation stage. 
A logical component represents the simply binding packages of related func-






Figure 5. (a) System Multi-tier components in the layers; (b) System Multi-tier components in the layers. 
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specification based on interface information model derived from business type 
model, and integration is made on the base of usage specified interfaces con-
tracts offered & used. Whereas a technical component is a unit that contains im-
plementation logic of the software component unit based on physical compo-
nent specification model. CORBA, NET, J2EE, and EJB are examples of current 
“physical” component technologies. Technical component integration is made 
on the base of realization contract specification related to the particular compo-
nent specification model, these are building blocks of software component units 
as stated above based on the component model specification model artifacts as 
defined in Figure 5(b). 
6.2. Existing Methods and Approaches to Application Functional  
Logic Security 
In modern times, the ruling perimeter security approach does not fit the e-business 
environment’s security challenges. Due to the fact that e-business mode of doing 
business implies “openness” to the external world, while the perimeter security 
implies existence of boundaries, that separate between the organization and the 
external world. 
Traditional security paradigm, which is as stated parameter security approach, 
does not relevant to e-business process. Therefore, business process appears to 
present most important change from traditional way to e-process [16]. 
E-business/e-commerce is the subject of a huge volume of ongoing research. 
Some of this relates to e-business information security, and just a small part 
(with regard to information security relates to business process identity security 
requirements of electronic processes. 
Traditionally, enterprises have prioritized and focused their IT security strate-
gies and budgets on protection of network perimeter and physical or logical 
access control to the application system environment. Following the common 
approaches, organizations security goals are defined to protect company’s in-
formation systems by eliminating the external threats, and by providing logical 
access control and restrictions to the application, but business process can be at-
tacked even when a very good network and infrastructure security programme is 
in place. For example, good network perimeter defence using firewalls, honey 
pot, intrusion detection systems and other network security components must 
still ensure the applications can be accessed by legitimate users and therefore at 
the same time can facilitate an opportunity for legitimate users to attack the or-
ganization business information systems by abusing the vulnerable e-commerce 
business process at application interface level. This is reason why, e-commerce 
business process build on base of two blocks; business logic and information 
flow. 
Therefore, there is a clear need for such technique or framework that could 
work for as an alternative approach for design e-business information systems 
security. 
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7. Proposed a Technique Secure Application Functional  
Processing Logic 
We propose secure application functional process logic for e-commerce compo-
nent-based application based on security requirements of e-process and security 
assurance logical component behaviour specification approach to formulize and 
design a solution for business logic vulnerability phenomena. First section of 
methodology follows security risk analysis in the CBSD rapid business logic and 
defensive strategy. In addition to this, we also propose in the second section, “A 
security Assurance Model process” to deal with logical component-ware reusing 
risks in application logic that cause logical vulnerability in e-commerce system 
to encounter in such situation while reusing component from its existing appli-
cation logic. This would contribute to solve identified problem. Application logic 
represents translation of domain business logic that, in component-based de-
veloped application logic interoperates business process for particular domain 
problem. 
Key Elements of security risk analysis in terms of Component-based e-commerce 
systems are: 1) Effect of attacks on system design; 2) Layer pattern; 3) Architec-
tural risk analysis for component-based business logic security. 
7.1. Effect of Attacks on System Design 
One of the first steps in system design should be the analysis of the possible at-
tacks on specific system and their consequences when successful, such as above 
stated case of e-commerce component-based web software application, and dis-
covered logical vulnerability in the application layer of business-tier. The tech-
nique of identifying vulnerability achieved via mismatching a sequence of com-
ponents in a system’s application design logic and problem caused by ignoring 
business process integration of component at the time of application’s business 
process logic(which can be mapped through scenario-based approach modelling 
business scenario, which represent a basic end-to-end system function, also de-
composed into sub-scenario, which identify functionality of important sub-system’s 
component) that permits the sequence of “Event Trigger” in the attack pattern to 
occur analysis of the description mentioned in the light of case study and vulne-
rability attack pattern reveals the event that transpire, what component is used 
to exploit the vulnerability in Barclay Bank case. This analysis can be used to de-
fine the countermeasures that need and will also be useful later to evaluate the 
system security. 
7.1.1. Layers Pattern 
Security encompasses all the architectural levels of a system. The layers archi-
tectural pattern is therefore the starting point of the design of secure systems. 
This pattern provides a structure where we can define patterns at all levels that 
together implement a secure system as defined in Figure 6. Its main idea is the 
decomposition of a system into hierarchical layers of abstraction, where the 
higher levels use the services of the lower levels. Here it provides a way to put  
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Figure 6. Layers architectural pattern. 
 
things in perspective and to describe the mechanisms needed at each layer. Fig-
ure shows the specific set of layers we consider. This figure shows some of the 
participants at each layer and their correspondence across layers. 
7.1.2. Architectural Risk Analysis for Component-Based Business Logic  
Security 
Design flaws account for 50% of the security problems in the component-based- 
software system [17]. Architectural risk analysis is, at best, a good general-purpose 
yardstick by which we can judge our security design’s effectiveness [14]. Because 
roughly 50 percent of security problems are the result of design flaws, perform-
ing a risk analysis at the design level is an important part of a solid good secure 
component-based-software system engineering. 
To encompass the design stage, any risk analysis process should be tailored. 
The object of this tailoring exercise is to determine specific vulnerabilities and 
risks that exist for the software [17]. Architectural level risk analysis Approach 
n-tier Web application design model by the Cigital USA does not clarify the each 
layer in the tier and its components, as its very important for a functional de-
composition of the application into major components, processes, data stores, 
and data communication flows, mapped against the environments across which 
the software will be deployed, allows for a review of threats and potential vulne-
rabilities, as its defined in the new proposed n-tier e-commerce web system arc-
hitectural risk analysis & security management model as defined in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. n-tier e-commerce web system architectural security management model. 
 
It can contemplate using modelling languages, such as UML, to attempt to 
model risks; even the most rudimentary analysis approaches can yield meaning-
ful results. Consider above model, which shows an n-tier deployment design 
model for web-based application issues. As we applied risk analysis principles to 
this level of design, we achieved immediately some useful conclusions about the 
security design of the application. 
During the risk analysis process must consider the following: 
1) The threats those are likely to want to attack the system. 
2) The risks present in each tier’s environment. 
3) The kinds of vulnerabilities that might exist in each component, as well as 
the data flow. 
4) The business impact of such technical risks, were they to be realized. 
5) The probability of such a risk being realized. 
7.2. Designed Defensive Strategy as a Solution to Deal Business  
Logic Concerns 
This part of methodology will provide a strong risk management control plan 
focusing on providing rigours component ware assurance for rapid development 
of CBSD business application logic for e-commerce applications as projected in 
Figure 8. 
Key elements of problem solution follow: 1) Strong risk management plan; 2) 
solution artefacts; 3) Security Characteristics of component-ware components 
and 4) Evaluation & validation of artefacts. 
7.2.1. Strong Risk Management Plan 
Ensure that every aspect of the application’s design must be clearly & sufficiently 
detailed to understand every assumption and designed function logic within the 
application by designer. 
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Figure 8. Security assurance CBSD model process. 
 
Mandate that all CBSD should be clearly commented to include the following 
information throughout. 
1) The purpose and intended use of each component (If Component code availa-
ble information of code, if not, its functional business logic within the compo-
nent through usage contract description). 
2) The assumptions & logic made by each component about anything that is 
outside of its direct control. 
3) Reference to all client-component which makes use of the component clear 
documentation to this effect could have prevented the logic flaw within the on-
line registration functionality 
(Note: Client here dose not refer to the user-end of the client-server relation-
ship but to other component (code) for which the component being considered 
is an Immediate dependency). 
7.2.2. Solution Artifacts 
As that there is no unique signature by which logic flaws in component-based- 
rapid developed web software application can be identified, because there is no 
silver bullet so far developed which could protect. 
Good Practice: Good practice that can be applied to significantly reduce the 
risk of logical flaws appearing within component-based-development and its 
logic. 
Security Characteristics of Component Ware Components: Since a soft-
ware component can be regarded as an IT product or system, it is natural to use 
the Common Criteria in assessing its security properties. The Common Criteria 
provide a framework for evaluating IT systems, and enumerate the specific secu-
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rity requirements for such systems. The security requirements are divided into 
two categories:  
1) Security functional requirements; 
2) Security assurance requirements. 
The Security Functional Requirements: 
Describe the desired security behaviour or functions expected of an IT system 
to counter threats in the system’s operating environment. These requirements 
are classified according to the security issues they address, and with varied levels 
of security strength. They include requirements in the following classes: security 
audit, communication, cryptographic support, user data protection, identifica-
tion and authentication, security management, privacy, protection of system se-
curity functions (security meta-data), resource utilization, system access, and 
trusted path/channels.  
The Security Assurance Requirements: 
The security functional requirements mainly concern the development and 
operational process of the IT system, with the view that a more defined and ri-
gorous process delivers higher confidence in the system’s security behaviour and 
operation. These requirements are classified according to the process issues they 
address, and with varied levels of security strength. The process issues include: 
life cycle support, configuration management, development, tests, vulnerability 
assessment, guidance documents, delivery and operation, and assurance main-
tenance.  
Therefore, in the Bank case security assurance requirement was also an issue. 
In the light of above stated security assurance CBSD process model. There are 
two further more important. 
Moreover, There are two further more important artifacts which we dived to 
consider 1) Security focus review of application design (falls under Separation of 
business logic) 2) Security focus code reviewing review (Falls under the Imple-
mentation logic). 
1) During Security-Focused Review of Application Design: Refers to tackle 
logical design flaws, during the security-focused review of design, must reflect 
upon every assumption made within the design of logical component ware stage 
and its business process integration, and try to imagine circumstances in which 
each assumption and logic might be violated. Focus particularly on any assumed 
condition that could conceivably be within the control of application user based 
on business process, rule and policy. 
2) Security-Focused Code and Implementation Review: Refers to technical 
vulnerability issues that could be due to environment level, Infrastructure con-
cerns or software artefact based multiple technology integration at the time of 
implementation. Carefully, think laterally about three key concerns at this stage; 
a) The ways in which unexpected user behaviour and Input will be handled by 
the application. 
b) The potential side effects of any dependencies and interoperation between 
different code components and physical component-model specification with 
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respect to integration between different application component functions and 
underlying middleware services. 
7.2.3. Verification & Validation 
It’s true that in real-world applications making all the assumptions clear is ob-
vious impossible but Model-based analysis and test generation leverage tools 
(such as Smartesting Tool, T-VEC Tool) that have been demonstrated to address 
several inadequacies of traditional testing [13]. They are systematic about provid-
ing requirement-based or design-based test coverage of complex software-inten- 
sive [18]. Not only are there tools that can systematically generate tests for each 
aspect of a requirement or design model, but they can identify defects (e.g., con-
tradiction or inconsistencies). Detecting defects early during the requirement or 
design process can reduce cost by eliminating. 
Proposed strategy and solution artefacts help to understand design and apply 
Model-based-Testing approach for component-based e-commerce applications 
assurance. So that the extracted test design from collected industrial case study 
of e-commerce system could follow a complete plan, such as, applying approach 
of modelling business scenario to generate test from extracted design test model 
as defined in Figure 9. This will cover integration strategies of components as 
compare to its requirement specifications, their offered and used interface fo-
cused design specifications, obtaining test scenarios from business events based 
on contracts involved between business components and their flow, and analyz-
ing business data to achieve test cases. Therefore, our focus is to consider mul-
ti-layer specification based on components business event scenario using Bank 
Case Study. In this technique, process is divided into two phases 1) High level 
view of system tier 2) Component layers. The High level view of system tier fo-
cus on the high level view of the design product, and component level layers will  
 
 
Figure 9. System middle tier & CBSD integration scheme for model based specifications. 
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consider the design, test, and diagnostics specification for a separate entity com-
ponent that take part in the system building. 
The most important point is to set focus on multi-tier specification .These will 
be system tier and the component tier. The system level tier represents a top 
view of the product, while the component level tier will account for the design, 
test, and diagnostics specification of the individual component that make up the 
system .This idea can be extended that a system can be nested as a component in 
the next higher order system, for the purpose of defining a design for test strate-
gy, each tier will require a model based method for capturing design, test re-
quirements, and diagnostic information. 
Once, this test design is completed, next stage is to set the test bed Model-based 
DFT approach for components business process integration testing, which in 
return allow the validation and verification of the whole process, intems of sys-
tem and component tier specifications that comprise the total Model based De-
sign for test approach. 
Model-based design for test approach for components business process inte-
gration testing, this will confirm the validation and verification of the whole 
process, in terms of system and component layer and tier specifications that en-
compass the overall Model based Design for test approach [19]. This approach 
based on the concept which confirms the philosophy of accuracy depends on 
precise construction; this reveals that discovering the design flaw in the product 
can be achieved early at design stage by using model based testing technique, for 
example integration flaws can be identified through “DFT method”. Therefore, 
this philosophy invites researchers to apply Model-based approach that helps to 
refine and detection design flaw, those exist between the components interfaces, 
while interacting with other components in the system in order to deliver a ser-
vice, trigger by the event, which call the particular service, composed with the 
business components based business process integration to develop “business 
process logic” in the e-commerce systems. 
8. Lesson Learned 
Therefore, in this case of bank developer completely ignored the purpose and 
type of behaviour specification of reused component in terms of requirement 
specification in each layer (an n-tier CBS application), component functional 
specification boundary conditions and knowledge of its defined interfaces within 
the systems, and ignored design specification for each layer component. This 
caused failure to meet the requirement specifications as compare to its function-
al specification based on design specification, for the purpose it was designed, 
based on its current logical component-based composition in the system. This 
gave birth to the design flaw in the component-ware. This all process of problem 
generated business logic vulnerability. This is a very serious violation of the prin-
ciple “specification purpose” in component-oriented logical component-ware at 
the time of business interface-driven integration, while ignoring usage contract 
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type specifications. It’s also case of “Test by Contract”, which means not only 
design specification of component ignored but also contract establishment among 
the interfaces and their designed logic throughout the process, which created 
security assurance problem among the interface-focused designed components 
behaviour through e-process, while developing component-oriented business 
logic. The boundary condition of this attack falls in between functional specifi-
cation and design specification. The attack triggering method is “Event-based- 
generated” e-process flow to violate business logic. 
9. Contribution 
Our contribution, proposed secure functional processing application logic for 
e-commerce component-based application, has covered the gap as stated above 
between traditional approaches and e-business process security requirements 
that will increase level of assurance during the practice of designing compo-
nent-based rapid developed e-commerce applications from existing software 
components and deploying component based business logic into e-commerce 
system. Which reminds that focus on e-process security beside the functionality 
is also very important, because this functionality can be productive only when it 
works as per and within its functional control defined by the business logic in 
the e-commerce applications. 
10. Conclusion 
Much of the security today is addressed as an audit activity that mostly relies on 
penetration testing such testing activities often attempt to identify vulnerabilities 
that belong to certain categories of threats & use tools that are tailored around 
these threats. They may have security policies that auditors follow which require 
them to check a specific list of things, but they often fall short of identifying vul-
nerabilities that a result of the way the application logic has been custom devel-
oped. The fact is that many attacks that are reported today fall under what we 
define as application logic attacks. Therefore, our contribution of proposed me-
thodology and approach will increase level of assurance during the practice of 
designing component-based rapidly developed web application software and 
deploying component based business logic into e-commerce system. This re-
minds us that focus on security besides the functionality is also very important 
because this functionality can be productive only when it works as per and within 
its functional control defined by the business logic in the e-commerce applica-
tion. 
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